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I explore whether time-series methods exploiting the long-run equilibrium
properties of the housing market might have detected the disequilibrium in U.S.
house prices which pre-dated the Great Recession as it was building up. Based
on real-time data, I show that a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004)
would have detected the disequilibrium with high confidence by the Summer of
2004, with the estimated extent of overvaluation peaking at about 15 per cent
immediately before the crisis. These results demonstrate that disequilibria in
the prices of at least one asset class–housing–can indeed be robustly detected
as they are building up.
Conceptually in line with Cochrane’s (1994) analysis for consumption and
GNP, and dividends and stock prices, a key factor in order to robustly identify
the transitory component of real house prices is applying Uhlig-style identifica-
tion to real rents, which are cointegrated with house prices, and are compara-
tively much closer to the common stochastic trend. Directly focusing on house
prices themselves, on the other hand, produces less robust results.
Keywords: Structural VARs; unit roots; cointegration; long-run restrictions;
medium-run identification; Great Recession; housing bubbles.
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‘[...] it is not, as Mr Greenspan argues, impossible to identify bubbles. When
prices have lost touch with fundamentals and there are other signs of excess,
such as rapid credit growth, alarm bells should ring. [...] Moreover, central
banks do not have to be certain they have identified a bubble before they act.
Monetary policy has constantly to deal with uncertainty–such as the size of
the output gap. Uncertainty is a reason for responding cautiously, but not for
doing nothing.’
–From ‘Monetary Myopia’, in The Economist, January 12, 2006
1 Introduction
In spite of the crucial role played by the unravelling of a disequilibrium in U.S. house
prices in triggering the recent financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession,
quite surprisingly no work has been devoted, so far, to developing a rigorous econo-
metric framework which might allow to detect such disequilibria in real time. This
is in sharp contrast to the vast effort which has instead been devoted, e.g., to ex-
panding DSGE models in order to incorporate a financial and a banking sector. As
a consequence, although policymakers often openly worry that housing markets may
be dangerously out of equilibrium, and may be heading into ‘bubble territory’,1 they
simply have no way of assessing such a possibility within a statistical framework, and
are therefore compelled to resort to intuitively sensible, but ultimately quite rough
indicators such as the rent-price ratio, or the ratio between house prices and incomes.
In this paper I explore whether time-series methods exploiting the long-run equi-
librium properties of the housing market might have detected the disequilibium in
U.S. house prices which pre-dated the Great Recession as it was building up. Based on
real-time data, I show that a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004) would
have detected the disequilibrium with very high confidence by the Summer of 2004,
with the estimated extent of overvaluation peaking at about 15 per cent during the
months immediately before the outbreak of the crisis. Cointegrated VARs identified
via long-run restrictions, on the other hand, produce fragile and uniformly weaker
results.2
My results demonstrate, by example, that disequilibria in the prices of at least
one asset class–housing–can indeed be robustly detected as they are building up.
Conceptually in line with Cochrane’s (1994) analysis for consumption and GNP, and
dividends and stock prices, a key factor in order to reliably and robustly identify
the transitory component of real house prices is focusing on real rents, which are
1In this paper I use the term ‘house price bubble’ uniquely to mean ‘a positive, large and transitory
deviation of real house prices from their long-run equilibrium value’. The notion of ‘bubble’ used
herein is therefore a strictly statistical one, and it does not have any connotation in terms of (e.g.)
the deviation being a ‘rational bubble’, as opposed to one due to non strictly rational factors.
2This is conceptually in line with Uhlig’s (2003, 2004) criticism of long-run restrictions, which
motivated his proposed alternative identification strategy.
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cointegrated with house prices, and are comparatively much closer to the common
stochastic trend. Specifically, when Uhlig (2003, 2004)-style identification is used in
order to extract the single most powerful shock at long horizons for real rents, all
horizons greater than or equal to 10 years ahead produce near numerically identical
results for the transitory component of real house prices. Intuitively, this reflects the
fact that real rents are, to a close approximation (and up to a scale factor), the sto-
chastic trend of real house prices, so that all horizons which are ‘not too short’ allow
to effectively capture the unit root in house prices. By contrast, when this approach
is used in order to extract the most powerful shock for house prices themselves, al-
ternative long horizons used for identification sometimes produce materially different
results.
The fact that the methodology analyzed herein would have allowed to detect the
disequilibrium in U.S. house prices by the Summer of 2004 does not automatically
imply that this would have called for countervailing measures on the part of the Fed-
eral Reserve: Since in the two previous identified episodes–in the second halves of
the 1970s and of the 1980s, respectively–over-valuations of 10 to 15 per cent had
not led to dramatic recessions, this evidence hardly suggests that, as of 2004, U.S.
policymakers might have been induced to act in order to reign in the disequilibrium.
Another way of saying this is that the lack of any countervailing measure on the part
of the FED during the period leading up to the crisis (in terms of either regulatory
interventions, or running a marginally tighter monetary policy) does not automati-
cally follow from the U.S. central bank not having explored, back then, the potential
usefulness of the methodology analyzed herein:3 As discussed, e.g., by then-Chairman
Bernanke, in order to find an instance in which the unravelling of a disequilibrium in
house prices had indeed had a negative, material impact on the economy one had to
reach back to the Great Depression.
The paper is organized as follows. The next two sections discuss the related liter-
ature, and analyze the unit root and cointegration properties of the data. Section 4
explores the size of the unit root component of real house prices. Section 5 presents
evidence from either cointegrated structural VARs identified via long-run restrictions,
or VARs in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004). In Section 6 I perform a partly
real-time exercise–in which I use real-time data for all series except real rents and
the supply of homes (for which such data are not available before 2011)–in order to
explore whether the methodology analyzed herein would have detected the disequilib-
rium in U.S. house prices in real time. Section 7 studies the data revision process for
real rents and the supply of homes based on the real-time data available since 2011.
Based on these results, in Section 8 I then perform a real-time exercise in which I
consider several ‘worst case scenarios’ for the extent of revision noise for real rents and
the supply of homes. To anticipate, unless, during the period in which the disequi-
3An important point to stress is that, by that time, both Uhlig (2003, 2004)-style identification,
and the advantages of working with VARs in levels–first extensively discussed by Sims, Stock, and
Watson (1990)–were already known to the profession.
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librium in house prices was building up, the revision noise had been () significantly
greater than it has historically been since 2011, and () consistently one-sided (i.e.,
systematically positive) for both real rents and the supply of homes, results would
have been near-numerically identical to those of Section 6 (that is: the VAR-based
methodology analyzed herein would indeed have detected the disequilibrium in U.S.
house prices by the Summer of 2004). Intuitively, this has to do with the fact that
the revision noise for real rents–which, as previously mentioned, are the key variable
for the purpose of identifying the stochastic trend in house prices–is very small, so
that the initial release is very close to the final estimate. Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Although the present work explores the dynamics of real house prices, the single paper
it is conceptually closest to is, in fact, Cochrane’s (1994) exploration of how to disen-
tangle permanent and transitory components of GNP and stock prices by exploiting
the informational content of consumption and dividends, respectively. Conceptually
in line with Cochrane (1994), Gallin (2008) explored the relationship between U.S.
real house prices and real rents within a bivariate cointegrated VECM framework,
but he limited himself to documenting cointegration between the two series, and the
forecasting power of the rent/price ratio for future movements in real house prices,
whereas he did not explore any of the issues I address in the present work.
With very few exceptions (discussed below) the problem of assessing the extent of
over- or under-valuation of real house prices has been largely ignored by the academic
literature. On the other hand, the issue is regularly discussed in the financial press
(see in particular the analysis provided by The Economist at the quarterly frequency),
and it is intensely analyzed within policymaking institutions,4 based on two simple
indicators: the rent/price ratio and the ratio between house prices and incomes. Al-
though both measures are intuitively sensible, there are two fundamental problems
with this approach. First, it is very much ad hoc, as it is not based on any rigorous
statistical framework exploiting the long-run equilibrium properties of the housing
market. Second, the fact that such an approach is not based on econometric methods
implies that it cannot produce measures of uncertainty around its ‘estimate’.5 As a
result, it does not allow to make probabilistic statements such as ‘There is an x per
cent probability that real house prices are over-valued by at least y per cent.’. Being
4As a typical example of work done at the Bank for International Settlements, see Scatigna, Sze-
mere, and Tsatsaronis (2014). Analogous evidence is produced, e.g., by the International Monetary
Fund ’s ‘Global Housing Watch’ (see at http://www.imf.org).
5A third problem with the traditional approach is that it is not infrequent for the two statistics
to provide starkly different, and sometimes even conflicting signals. The August 30, 2014 issue of
The Economist, for example, reported that real house prices in New Zealand were over-valued by
30 per cent based on incomes, and by 74 per cent based on rents. In China, they were over-valued
by 7 per cent based on rents, but they were under -valued by 38 per cent based on incomes.
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able to provide such an assessment would be of obvious relevance within a policy
context, as (e.g.) it might play an important role in the decision to change, or not
to change, specific macro-prudential instruments such as caps to the loan-to-value
ratio. Developing an econometric framework which allows to make such probabilistic
statements is a key objective of the present work.
Iacoviello (2000) explored housing market dynamics in six European countries
based on cointegrated structural VARs identified via long-run restrictions. A key
difference with the present work is that he did not compute equilibrium values for real
house prices, as his analysis was mostly focused on IRFs and variance decompositions.
A potentially important limitation of Iacoviello’s work is that, as I discuss in Section
5 below, cointegrated VARs identified via long-run restrictions tend to produce fragile
results.
Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) constructed measures of the imputed annual
rental cost of owning a home for several U.S. local housing markets, and used it in
order to assess the extent of over- or under-valuation of real house prices. Their overall
conclusion was that
‘[...] in 2004, prices looked reasonable. Only a few cities, such as Miami,
Fort Lauderdale, Portland (Oregon) and, to a degree, San Diego, had
valuation ratios approaching those of the 1980s’.
As we will see, this conclusion is radically at odds with the results from my real-
time exercise, which identifies, with very high confidence, an over-valuation of U.S.
real house prices by the Summer of 2004.
3 Unit Root and Cointegration Properties of the
Data
Figure 1 plots the eight series I will be working with: real house prices and real rents;
housing starts, the monthly ‘supply of homes’,6 and overall employees in construction;
and inflation, the Federal Funds rate, and the 30-year mortgage rate. As for the
Federal Funds rate, when I work with the longer sample up to August 2017, for the
ZLB period I consider Wu and Xia’s (2016) ‘shadow Federal Funds rate’ (which in the
second panel of Figure 1 is represented by the blue line), in order to better capture
the monetary policy stance. (From now on, ‘ex post real rate’ should be regarded as
6The ‘monthly supply of homes in the United States’ is described by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census as ‘[...] the ratio of houses for sale to houses sold. This statistic provides an indication
of the size of the for sale inventory in relation to the number of houses currently being sold. The
months’ supply indicates how long the current for sale inventory would last given the current sales
rate if no additional new houses were built.’ This variable is therefore essentially a measure of the









            
 
Figure 1  The raw data (January 1963-August 2017)  
shorthand for ‘ex post real Federal Funds rate’. By the same token, ‘PCE deflator’
will be shorthand for ‘core PCE deflator’.) For details on the data, see Appendix 1.
I have chosen to work with overall employees–rather than hours worked7–in the
construction sector for two reasons. First, the two alternative sets of results based on
employees, and on hours worked respectively, for either the full sample period April
1971-August 2017, or the shorter sample excluding the ZLB period (April 1971-
November 2008), are near-identical.8 Second, and crucially, real-time data for average
hours worked in construction–which are needed in order to compute overall hours
worked in the construction sector (see previous footnote)–are not available.
3.1 Unit root tests
Table 1 reports bootstrapped p-values for Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) unit
root tests.9 The table reports results for either the two sample periods I will consider
in Section 5 (April 1971-November 2008, and April 1971-August 2017), and, only for
house prices and rents (which are both available at least since January 1963), and
the real ex post Federal Funds rate, for the period January 1963-August 2017. For
either real house prices, real rents, or employees in construction, which exhibit obvious
trends, the tests are based on models including an intercept and a time trend.10 For
the other series, tests are based on models including an intercept, but no time trend.
Evidence of a unit root is uniformly strong for real rents and real house prices, the
Federal Funds rate, the 30-year mortgage rate, inflation, employees in construction,
and housing starts. Evidence for the real ex post Federal Funds rate is mixed based on
either of the samples starting in 1971, whereas a unit root is strongly rejected based
on the longer sample January 1963-August 2017. Further, for the sample January
1959-August 201711 the rejection is even stronger, with the -values ranging between
0.000 and 0.065. This clearly suggests that the real ex post Federal Funds rate should
be regarded as I(0), and that the mixed and inconclusive results obtained based on
shorter samples should likely be regarded as the figment of using comparatively small
sample periods. This is consistent with the fact that, as I discuss in the next sub-
section, Johansen’s tests produce strong evidence of cointegration between real rents
7As discussed in Appendix A, the series for overall hours worked in the construction sector has
been constructed as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), that is, as the product of all employees in the
construction sector and average hours worked in construction.
8Results based on hours worked are not reported here for reasons of space, but they are available
upon request.
9For either series, p-values have been computed by bootstrapping 10,000 times estimated
ARIMA(p,1,0) processes. In all cases, the bootstrapped processes are of length equal to the se-
ries under investigation. As for the lag order, p, since, as it is well known, results from unit root
tests may be sensitive to the specific lag order which is being used, for reasons of robustness I
consider four alternative lag orders, 3, 6, 9 and 12 months.
10The reason for including a time trend is that, as discussed e.g. by Hamilton (1994, pp. 501),
the model used for unit root tests should be a meaningful one also under the alternative.
11The PCE deflator is only available since January 1959.
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Table 1 United States: bootstrapped p-values for
Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock unit root tests
Lag order:
p=3 p=6 p=9 p=12
January 1963-August 2017
Log real rent 0.942 0.874 0.647 0.514
Log real house price 0.297 0.416 0.183 0.073
Ex post real Federal Funds rate 0.000 0.037 0.064 0.086
April 1971-November 2008
Log real rent 0.833 0.755 0.488 0.287
Log real house price 0.351 0.257 0.119 0.107
Federal Funds rate 0.312 0.485 0.258 0.454
30-year conventional mortgage rate 0.767 0.762 0.679 0.629
Inflation 0.031 0.479 0.539 0.579
Ex post real Federal Funds rate 0.000 0.067 0.088 0.102
Log housing starts 0.447 0.223 0.091 0.144
Log monthly supply of homes 0.310 0.521 0.425 0.351
Log all employees in construction 0.564 0.121 0.074 0.039
April 1971-August 2017
Log real rent 0.787 0.673 0.434 0.305
Log real house price 0.235 0.220 0.080 0.063
Federal Funds rate 0.384 0.551 0.333 0.522
30-year conventional mortgage rate 0.856 0.871 0.819 0.778
Inflation 0.011 0.359 0.446 0.500
Ex post real Federal Funds rate 0.003 0.113 0.171 0.181
Log housing starts 0.288 0.142 0.073 0.113
Log monthly supply of homes 0.079 0.141 0.086 0.056
Log all employees in construction 0.695 0.273 0.222 0.154
 Based on 10,000 bootstrap replications of estimated ARIMA
processes.
and real house prices: If the ex post real rate were I(1), theory suggests that this
should not be the case.12 The reason is that, in equilibrium, the ratio between rents
and house prices should be equal to the real interest rate. Since, as discussed, both
series are I(1), this implies that if the real rate is I(0), rents and house prices ought
to be cointegrated, whereas if it is I(1) they ought not to. The fact that Johansen’s
tests detect strong evidence of cointegration between real rents and real house prices is
therefore in line with the rejection of a unit root in the real ex post Federal Funds rate
based on the longest period. Finally, evidence of a unit root in the supply of homes
is strong based on the sample period excluding the ZLB, whereas it is weak based
on the full sample period April 1971-August 2017. In what follows I will therefore
exclude this series from the cointegrated SVAR for the latter period, whereas I will
include it in the SVAR for the former one. In the end, however, this will turn out to
be irrelevant, because, as mentioned in the Introduction, cointegrated SVARs tend
to produce weak and fragile results. On the other hand, I will include the supply of
homes in the VARs in levels, since this approach does not require to take a stand on
the series’ order of integration (see, e.g., the discussion in Hamilton (1994)).
3.2 Cointegration tests
Table 2 reports results from Johansen’s cointegration tests. The main results can be
summarized as follows.
Evidence of cointegration between real rents and real house prices is strong based
on the sample period January 1963-August 2017, and slightly less so based on the
period April 1971-August 2017, although it is still detected at the 10 per cent level.
Interestingly, the null of no cointegration is not rejected based on the period April
1971-November 2008, which saw the building up of the disequilibrium in house prices
which pre-dated the Great Recession, but only saw the very beginning of its unrav-
elling. These results naturally suggest that house prices and rents are indeed cointe-
grated, but their temporary divergence during the period in which the ‘bubble’ was
inflating prevents Johansen’s tests from detecting cointegration based on the shortest
sample period. On the other hand, increasing the sample size, either backward, or
especially forward in time, provides additional information which allows the tests to
detect cointegration.
Results from the eight-variables system for the period April 1971-November 2008
point towards six cointegration vectors based on the trace test, and four based on the
maximum eigenvalue test. In what follows, I will work under the assumption that
the system features four cointegration vectors. By the same token, results from the
seven-variables system for the period April 1971-August 2017 point towards six coin-
tegration vectors based on the trace test, and four based on the maximum eigenvalue
test. Likewise, in what follows I will work under the assumption that the system
features four cointegration vectors.
12I wish to thank Matteo Iacoviello for an extremely useful email exchange on this issue.
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Table 2 United States: results from Johansen’s cointegration tests
Trace tests of the null of no cointegration against the alternative of h or more cointegrating vectors:
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3 h = 4 h = 5 h = 6 h = 7
Log real house price and log real rent:
January 1963-August 2017 17.69 (0.041) — — — — — —
April 1971-November 2008 13.10 (0.148) — — — — — —
April 1971-August 2017 17.51 (0.062) — — — — — —
Eight-variables system:
April 1971-November 2008 392.64 (0.000) 234.97 (0.000) 141.69 (0.000) 75.56 (0.000) 38.174 (0.027) 19.93 (0.050) 7.55 (0.147)
Seven-variables system excluding supply of houses:
April 1971-August 2017 295.29 (0.000) 182.02 (0.000) 97.16 (0.000) 49.13 (0.000) 21.96 (0.025) 9.70 (0.032) —
Maximum eigenvalue tests of h versus h+1 cointegrating vectors:
0 versus 1 1 versus 2 2 versus 3 3 versus 4 4 versus 5 5 versus 6 6 versus 7
Log real house price and log real rent:
January 1963-August 2017 16.80 (0.036) — — — — —
April 1971-November 2008 9.35 (0.321) — — — — —
April 1971-August 2017 15.05 (0.089) — — — — —
Eight-variables system:
April 1971-November 2008 157.68 (0.000) 93.28 (0.000) 66.13 (0.000) 37.39 (0.040) 18.24 (0.567) — —
Seven-variables system excluding supply of houses:
April 1971-August 2017 113.27 (0.000) 84.86 (0.000) 48.03 (0.003) 27.17 (0.096) 12.25 (0.589) — —
 Bootstrapped p-values (in parentheses) are based on 10,000 bootstrap replications, based on Cavaliere et al.’s (2012) methodology.
4 How Large Is the Size of the Unit Root in Real
House Prices?
Having detected strong evidence of a unit root in real house prices, the next logical
step is to investigate its size, that is, its importance in driving the series’ fluctuations,
compared to the role played by the stationary component. This will allow us to
understand how strong mean-reversion in real house prices actually is, and what
fraction of the period-on-period change in real house prices should be regarded as
permanent. Following Cochrane (1988), I explore this issue based on the variance
ratio, which for variable , sample length  , and horizon , is defined as
 = 
−1Var ( − −)
Var ( − −1)

 −  + 1 (1)
I estimate  as in Cochrane (1988), as
̂ =











where the ̂’s are the sample autocorrelations of the first difference of . I construct
confidence intervals for ̂ via the non-parametric spectral bootstrap procedure I used
in Benati (2007), which is described in Section 2 of the online appendix.13 As I showed
in Benati (2007) via Monte Carlo, this procedure has good coverage properties, in
the sense of being able to effectively capture the authentic extent of uncertainty in
the underlying data generation process.
Figure 2 reports the simple estimate of the variance ratio (that is, ̂) at horizons
up to 25 years ahead, together with the 16th, 84th, 5th and 95th percentiles of
the bootstrapped distribution. Evidence suggests that, at the monthly frequency,
the fraction of the period-on-period change in log real house prices which is due
to the unit root component is equal to about 13 per cent, and it is quite precisely
estimated, with a 90 per cent-coverage confidence interval stretching from about 7
to about 26 per cent. This points towards a dominant component of mean-reversion
in real house prices, so that their month-on-month fluctuations should be regarded
as overwhelmingly transitory. An important point to stress is that ̂ stabilizes, and
it becomes essentially flat, after about 10 years, thus clearly pointing towards the
reliability of the estimates.
I now turn to a comparison between the results produced by cointegrated VARs
identified via long-run restrictions, and by VARs in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003,
2004), based on two alternative sample periods: the full sample up to 2017, and the
shorter one excluding the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) period. To anticipate, whereas–
once focusing on the most powerful shock for real rents–results produced by VARs











                                                 
 
 
Figure 2  Estimates of the size of the permanent component of U.S. log 
             real house prices based on Cochrane’s variance ratio estimator  
in levels are uniformly robust across the board, those produced by cointegrated are
consistently weaker, and fragile along a number of dimensions.
5 Evidence from Structural VARs
Figures 3 and A.8 (in the appendix) report, for the full sample April 1971-August
2017, evidence based on a structural VAR (SVAR) in levels identified as in Uhlig
(2003, 2004), and a cointegrated SVAR identified via long-run restrictions, respec-
tively.14 In the former case, the permanent shock driving rents’ and house prices’
common stochastic trend has been identified as the shock explaining the maximum
fraction of the fraction of forecast error variance (FEV) of real rents at the 25 years
ahead horizon,15 whereas in the latter case it has been identified as the only shock
having a permanent impact on log real rents. In either figure, the three panels show
() house prices, together with their estimated stochastic trend and bootstrapped
confidence bands;16
() the fraction of bootstrap replications for which, in each individual month,
house prices’ transitory component is estimated to have been positive; and
() the estimated transitory component of house prices with bootstrapped con-
fidence bands.17
Figures 4-6 and A.3-A.4 in the appendix are all based on the VAR in levels and
the longer sample period: Figure 4 shows house prices’ transitory component together
with the unemployment rate; Figure 5 shows, for alternative horizons used for the
identification of the permanent shock, the transitory component obtained when Uh-
lig’s (2003, 2004) procedure is used to extract the most powerful shock for real rents
and, respectively, real house prices; Figure 6 shows the transitory component ob-
tained based on alternative lag orders (with the horizon used for identification set to
25 years ahead); and Figure A.3-A.4 show impulse-response functions (IRFs) to the
permanent shock to real rents, and the fractions of FEV of individual series explained
by the shock, respectively, based on the baseline setup (that is, the lag order set to
12, and the horizon used for identification set to 25 years ahead).
Figures A.9 to A.16 in the appendix are all based on VARs in levels: Figure A.9
14All VARs in levels have been estimated based on the eight series shown in Figure 1. As for the
cointegrated VARs, for the reasons discussed in Section 3.2, results for the sample excluding the
ZLB period have been based on the baseline 8-variables system, whereas those for the longer sample
have been based on the 7-variables system excluding the supply of homes. In both cases, the lag
order has been set to =12. In Section 5.2 I explore robustness to alternative lag orders.
15As I discuss below, any ‘target horizon’ greater than or equal to 10 years ahead produces near
numerically identical results.
16The cointegrated VECM has been bootstrapped as in Cavaliere, Rahbek, and Taylor (2012)
conditional on the identified number of cointegration vectors, whereas the VAR in levels has been
bootstrapped as in, e.g., Barsky and Sims (2011).
17In order to make the figures easier to read, all estimated objects have been smothed via a
3-month rolling window.
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shows the same results as in Figure 3, but based on the shorter sample excluding
the ZLB period; Figures A.10-A.12 show the same results shown in Figures 4, A.3,
and A.4, but based on the owner’s equivalent rent component of the CPI,18 rather
than based on the shelter component I use throughout the main body of the paper;
Figures A.13-A.15 show the same results shown in Figures 4, A.3, and A.4, but based
on identifying the most powerful shock for real house prices themselves, rather than
for real rents; finally, Figure A.16 shows house prices’ transitory components obtained
by eliminating from the VAR one series (other than rents) at a time.
I start by discussing the main substantive results, and I then turn to issues of
robustness.
5.1 Main substantive results
The main substantive findings can be summarized as follows.
First, the methodology proposed herein identifies two large, transitory deviations
of real house prices from their estimated stochastic trend in the second halves of
the 1970s and 1980s, respectively; a third, slightly larger deviation corresponding to
the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the financial crisis and the Great
Recession; and–inevitably tentatively–a fourth one at the very end of the sample.
Second, in all four cases, statistical significance is very high. In particular, focusing
on the disequilibrium which pre-dated the Great Recession, the 84%, 90%, and 95%
thresholds for the fractions of bootstrap replications for which the transitory compo-
nent of house prices is estimated to have been positive were crossed in May, September
and December 2004, respectively, and subsequently the fractions remained above the
90% threshold until November 2007. By the same token, during the most recent, and
still ongoing episode, the fraction of bootstrap replications for which house prices are
estimated to have been above their stochastic trend has consistently been beyond
90% since the end of 2016.
Third, the transitory component of house prices exhibits a strong negative con-
temporaneous correlation with the unemployment rate, and leads it by about four
years (see the left and, respectively, right hand-side panels of Figure 4). The leading-
indicator properties of transitory house prices for the unemployment rate emerge in an
especially stark way from the episode associated with the Great Recession, with the
fluctuations in the unemployment rate during the crisis closely tracking (up to a scale
factor) the transitory fluctuation in house prices four years before.19 The interpre-
tation of these stylized facts is however not straightforward. Consider, for example,
the Volcker recession and the more recent Great Recession. Both episodes had been
18As discussed in online Appendix 1, the owner’s equivalent rent component of the CPI is only
available since January 1983.
19In principle, this is conceptually in line with Leamer’s (2007) position that ‘housing is the
business cycle’. For an extensive discussion of the conceptual limitations of Leamer’s (2007) position,










          
 
Figure 3  Results based on a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004): Estimated  
             permanent and transitory components of log real house prices (estimates smoothed 












Figure 4  Results based on a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004): Estimated  




characterized by a crash in house prices–with the transitory component moving from
strongly positive to strongly negative–and by a dramatic increase in the unemploy-
ment rate. In the former episode, however, most macroeconomists would agree that
the direction of causality went from increases in the Federal Funds rate engineered
by the FED in order to crush inflation, to both an increase in unemployment, and a
collapse in house prices. In the latter case things are much less clear-cut. Part of the
crash in house prices may have originated in a series of hikes in the Federal Funds
rate which started in July 2004, but it is possible that a large, or even dominant
portion of the crash simply reflected the bursting of the bubble. For the sake of the
argument, let’s assume that the collapse in house prices uniquely originated from the
bursting of the bubble, and that the subsequent increase in the unemployment rate
was the consequence of the crash. Under this scenario, two superficially very similar
patterns of correlation between house prices and the unemployment rate associated
with two major recessions would in fact imply very different directions of causality.
Very similar arguments can be made for several other superficially similar episodes,
so that, in general, an interpretation of the evidence in Figure 4 is not clear-cut.
Fourth, the estimated over-valuation of real house prices during the period im-
mediately preceding the outbreak of the financial crisis was not substantially greater
than the corresponding over-valuations during the two previous identified episodes.
Conceptually in line with, e.g., the analysis of Mian and Sufi (2014), and of Jordà,
Schularick, and Taylor (2015), these results are therefore compatible with the notion
that what made the recent housing bubble truly devastating was the fact that it had
been developing concomitantly with the building up of massive amounts of household
debt. On the other hand, the extent of over-valuation, per se, does not bear any
clear-cut implication for the depth of a subsequent recession: In fact, the housing
market disequilibrium of the second half of the 1980s was followed by the compara-
tively mild recession of the early 1990s, whereas the deep recession of the early 1980s
is near-universally ascribed to Paul Volcker’s contractionary monetary policy, rather
than to a housing market crash.
Fifth, at the 10-year horizon the permanent shock driving rents’ and house prices’
common stochastic trend explains nearly 90 per cent of the FEV of real rents, whereas
it explains less than 30 per cent of the FEV of real house prices. This confirms the
visual impression (see the first panel of Figure 1) that real rents are comparatively
much closer to the common stochastic trend than real house prices, and it is in line
with the evidence (see Figure 2) that house prices contain a dominant transitory
component. Crucially, a comparison between Figures A.3 and A.14 in the appendix
shows that results are qualitatively the same, and numerically very close, when Uhlig
(2003, 2004)-style identification is used in order to extract the most powerful shock for
house prices themselves, rather than for rents. This clearly shows that the relationship
between rents and house prices is qualitatively the same as that between consumption
and GNP, and dividends and stock prices, explored by Cochrane (1994). Finally, the
identified permanent shock explains little-to-nil of the FEV of inflation, interest rates,
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and housing starts; about 25-30 per cent of the FEV of the supply of homes at all
horizons beyond two years ahead; and sizeable amounts–at the 10-year horizon,
nearly half–of the FEV of employees in construction at all horizons beyond about
three years ahead.
5.2 Robustness issues
Turning to robustness issues, the following main findings emerge from the relevant
figures:
first, results based on cointegrated VARs are manifestly inferior to those based on
VARs in levels along two important dimensions. (1) They are not robust to changes
in the sample period (in particular, to including or excluding the ZLB period): This
emerges very clearly from a comparison between Figure A.7 and Figure A.8, with the
two sets of results being quite significatly different. The analogous comparison for the
evidence based on VARs in levels, on the other hand (see Figures 3 and A.9), does
not point towards any appreciable difference between results including and excluding
the ZLB period. (2) The results produced by cointegrated VARs identified via long-
run restrictions are systematically characterized by a greater extent of econometric
uncertainty: This clearly emerges from a comparison between Figures 3 and A.8, and
A.9 and A.7, respectively. In the rest of the paper I will therefore exclusively focus on
results produced by VARs in levels.
Second, when Uhlig (2003, 2004)-style identification is used in order to extract the
single most powerful shock at long horizons for real rents, all horizons greater than or
equal to 10 years ahead produce near numerically identical results for the transitory
component of real house prices (see Figure 5). Intuitively, this reflects the fact that
real rents are, to a close approximation (and up to a scale factor), the stochastic trend
of real house prices, so that all horizons which are ‘not too short’ allow to effectively
capture the unit root in house prices. By contrast, when this approach is used in
order to extract the most powerful shock for house prices themselves, alternative long
horizons used for identification sometimes produce materially different results.
Third, VARs in levels produce very similar results based on either the shelter or
the owner’s equivalent rent components of the CPI. Intuitively, this reflects the fact
that () over the common sample period, the two CPI components have been nearly
indistinguishable (see Figure A.1 in the appendix), and () as mentioned, results
produced by VARs in levels are robust to using alternative sample periods.
Fourth, alternative lag orders produce, most of the time, very similar transitory
components of real house prices. In particular, in the left hand-side panel in Figure
6 only the transitory component based on =6 sometimes materially diverges from
those produced by the other lag orders considered. Since results based on either
=12 or =24 are uniformly close (and they are close to those based on =3), one
possible ‘rule of thumb’ suggested by the left hand-side panel is to use a sufficiently










                      
 
Figure 5  Results based on a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004): Estimated  
             transitory components of log real house prices, for alternative horizons used for  
             the identification of the permanent shock (estimates smoothed with a 3-month 












             .  
 
Figure 6  Results based on a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004), for alternative lag orders 
 
permanent shock shown in the right hand-side panel provide further validation to
this: As it was shown in Figure 2, the 90 per cent-coverage confidence interval for
the size of the unit root in house prices stretches from slightly below 10 per cent to
nearly 30 per cent. This means that whereas either =12 or =24 produce plausible
values for the long-horizons fractions of FEV of real house prices explained by the
permanent shock, both =3 and =6 produce values which are somehow too large.
This provides an additional rationale for imposing, in estimation, a lag order at least
as large as =12.
5.3 Which features are key in order to robustly identify the
transitory component of house prices?
For the purpose of using this methodology in order to robustly detect disequilibria in
house prices, a crucial issue is identifying which features play a key role, and which
ones are instead second-order. Beyond–as previously discussed–
() using VARs in levels (as opposed to cointegrated VARs);
() applying Uhlig (2003, 2004)-style identification to real rents (rather than to
house prices themselves); and
() using a sufficiently large lag order,
other features do not seem play a crucial role. In particular, series other than real
rents, considered individually, appear to play a distinctly secondary role. As Figure
A.16 (in the appendix) shows, indeed, eliminating these series from the VAR one at
a time does not produce materially different estimates of the transitory component
of house prices. At the same time, it is important to stress that eliminating all of
them–thus ending up with a bivariate VAR for real rents and real house prices–
produces dramatically different estimates of house prices’ permanent and transitory
components (see Figure A.17). In particular, the transitory component is estimated
to have been uniformly quite small, so that fluctuations in real house prices have been
driven, to a significant extent, by permanent shocks. This is in stark contrast to the
results in Section 4, where Cochrane’s variance ratio estimator suggested that the
size of the unit root is between slightly below 10 and almost 30 per cent, with a point
estimate of 13 per cent. Further, the transitory component of real house prices is
estimated to have been significantly smaller, during the period pre-dating the Great
Recession, than it had been during the second half of the 1970s, which appears as
implausible. So, although, considered individually, series other than rents exhibit a
limited informational content for the permanent component of house prices, once they
are considered jointly their informational content is definitely non-negligible.
I now turn to the main substantive issue of whether this methodology would have
allowed to detect the disequilibium in U.S. house prices which pre-dated the Great










     
 
Figure 7  Results based on a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004): Partially real- 
             time estimates of the transitory component of log real house prices, and fractions of 
             bootstrap replications for which the transitory component is estimated to be positive 
 
6 Could the Disequilibrium in U.S. House Prices
Have Been Detected in Real Time?
Figure 7 shows the estimated transitory component of real house prices, and the
fraction of bootstrap replications for which the component is estimated to have been
positive, based on the following exercise. For each month  , starting from January
2003, and up until October 2008 (i.e., one month after the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers), I estimate the same 8-variables VAR in levels I have discussed in the previous
section based on the following data:
() for all series except real rents and the supply of houses, the real-time data
which were available in month  ;
() for real rents and the supply of houses, the series available as of the end of
the sample (i.e., August 2017).
The reason for this is the following. As discussed in the data appendix (Appendix
1), real-time data for rents and the supply of houses are available only starting from
April and May 2011, respectively. In the next section I use these data in order to
characterize the data-revision process for either series. Then, based on this, in Section
8 I perform an exercise near-identical to the one performed herein, with the only
difference that, for real rents and the supply of houses, for each month  I consider
several ‘worst case scenarios’ in terms of what the revision noise might have been in
that specific month. Specifically, by ‘worst case scenario’ I mean the worst possible
circumstances for the purpose of identifying the house price ‘bubble’ in real time.
Another way of saying this is that in Section 8 I will be ‘stacking the cards against
myself’, considering a set of extremely challenging circumstamces for the methodology
analyzed herein. To anticipate, evidence clearly shows that, even in a worst case
scenario in which the magnitude of revision noise had been either 2 or 3 times what it
has historically been since 2011, mymethodology would have detected the bubble with
very high confidence four years before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Intuitively,
this has to do with the fact that, as I document in the next Section, for real rents–
which, as previously discussed, is the key series for the purpose of identifying the unit
root component of real house prices–the extent of revision noise is negligible, so that
the first release is very close to the final estimate. (For the supply of houses, on the
other hand, the extent of such noise is non-negligible, but this series plays a much
less important role for the purpose of identifying the permanent component of house
prices–see Figure A.16.) This implies that, for practical purposes, taking, or not
taking into account of the revision noise for these two series makes little difference.
Because of this, I have chosen to start by discussing the results from the present
exercise, which–since it does not involve adding revision noise to the final estimates
of rents and the supply of houses–presents the distinct advantage of being more
transparent.
Two main results emerge from Figure 7:
first, the methodology analyzed herein would have detected, with high confidence,
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the disequilibrium in U.S. house prices which pre-dated the Great Recession about
three years before the outbreak of the crisis, in August 2007,20 and four years before
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This is clearly apparent from the right hand-side
panel, with the fraction of bootstrap replications for which the transitory component
of house prices is estimated to have been positive crossing the 84, 90, and 95 per cent
thresholds in May,21 August, and September 2004 respectively. Between September
2004 and the Summer of 2007, the fraction had then been consistently oscillating
around or above the 95 per cent threshold, with the single exception of a temporary
drop to a trough of 80 per cent in October 2005. Overall, with the single exception of
this temporary decrease, the fraction had consistently remained high, or very high,
during the entire period between the Summer of 2004 and the outbreak of the financial
crisis.
Second, the extent of house prices’ over-valuation had typically been non-negligible:
By early 2006, the point estimate had crossed the 10 per cent threshold, with the
90 per cent-coverage confidence interval stretching to almost 20 per cent, and during
subsequent months, up until the outbreak of the crisis, it oscillated around or above
that level.
These results show that, in fact, the disequilibrium in U.S. house prices which
pre-dated the Great Recession could have been detected with very high confidence
four years before the collapse of Lehman Brothers. As discussed in the Introduction,
the key point here is obviously not to ‘(re)litigate the past’, and in particular the role
played by the Federal Reserve during the period leading up to the financial crisis.
Rather, my objective is to show, by example, that house prices’ disequilibria can
in fact be detected as they are building up based on standard time-series methods
exploiting the long-run equilibrium properties of the housing market.
The present work is therefore an illustration of, and provides validation to, the crit-
icism the Economist magazine laid out, starting from the second half of the 1990s, to
Alan Greenspan’s position that ‘bubbles cannot be detected’. The crux of the Econo-
mist’s argument (see the opening quotation) was that there is nothing special about
asset prices, and, in the same way as central banks routinely estimate unobserved
economic objects such as potential GDP and the natural rate of unemployment–and
take monetary policy decisions based on them–the same could be done for stock and
house prices.
I now turn to analyzing the revision process for real rents and the supply of homes.
20The outbreak of the financial crisis is typically taken to be early August 2007, when the European
Central Bank started massively intervening in Euro area money markets.
21In fact, the 84 per cent threshold had first been crossed in December 2003, but until May 2004










                   
 
Figure 8  Features of the data revision process for the real rent and the monthly supply of houses 
 
7 The Revision Process for Real Rents and the
Supply of Homes
Figure 8 illustrates the revision process for real rents and the supply of homes since
2011, when real-time data for the two series first start being available.22 Specifically,
the top row shows, for either series, the log-distance from the final estimate–defined
as the difference between the logarithms of the final estimate and of the current
estimate–as a function of the time (in months) which has expired since the first data
release. The following main facts emerge from the two top panels:
first, the extent of revision noise for real rents–the crucial series for the purpose
of robustly identifying the permanent component of real house prices–is two orders
of magnitude smaller than the corresponding noise for the supply of homes, and it is
essentially negligible. This means that, for rents, the initial data release is very close
to the final estimate, so that, for practical purposes, the latter can be regarded as
essentially equivalent to the former. For the supply of homes, on the other hand, the
extent of revision noise is not negligible, but, as the exercise of Section 8 will show,
this is not a problem, since this series plays a less important role in identifying the
unit root in house prices.
Second, for the supply of homes the revision process ends about two years after
the initial release. For rents, on the other hand, the process lasts longer, but given
the negligible extent of revision noise this is, once again, essentially irrelevant for
practical purposes.
The bottom row of Figure 8 characterizes a different aspect of the revision process
for the two series, with the two panels showing, for all available months since when
real-time data start being available, the log-distance from the final estimate both on
release, and for selected time intervals after release. The main finding emerging from
the two panels is that whereas for the supply of homes the log-distance from the
final estimate is essentially zero-mean, for rents this is not the case: In particular, at
short ‘horizons’ (i.e., until one-two years after the first release) the distance has been
mostly positive, thus implying that, since April 2011, the initial release for real rents
has typically been ‘too high’.
In the real-time exercise in Section 8 I will assume that, for either series, the
revision process since 2011 shown in Figure 8 provides a good characterization of the
revision process for the period of interest (January 2003-October 2008). In particular,
I will assume that the magnitude of the revision noise for the period January 2003-
October 2008 is well captured by the magnitude for the period since 2011. (As I
discuss in Section 8, for robustness reasons I will then also consider exercises in which
I scale up the revision noise since 2011 by a factor of either 2 or 3.) Although I have no
hard proof that this is indeed the case, I regard this assumption as reasonable, as it
22To be precise, as discussed in the data Appendix 1, real-time data for the PCE deflator are
available since August 2000. The problem is that real-time data for nominal rents are only available
since April 2011.
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appears as implausible that the revision process for either series may have materially
changed since 2008. Prima facie evidence that the assumption is a plausible one
is provided by the fact that for all of the other six series in the VAR, for which
real-time data are available at least since the early 2000s, the revision process clearly
appears to have remained unchanged since then. Specifically, neither the Federal
Funds rate nor the 30-year mortgage rate are ever revised. As for the remaining four
series, the evidence in Figure A.18 in the appendix provides no support whatsoever
to the notion that their revision process may have materially changed over the period
August 2000-September 2008.23
I now turn to discussing in detail the results from the real-time exercise.
8 A Real-Time Exercise with a Worst-Case Sce-
nario for the Revision Noise for Rents and the
Supply of Homes
Figure 9 shows the same evidence as in Figure 7 (i.e., the transitory component of
real house prices, and the fraction of bootstrap replications for which the component
is estimated to have been positive), based on an exercise which is identical to that
performed in Section 6, except for the following.
In Section 6 I used, for real rents and the supply of houses, the series available
at the end of the sample, which is equivalent to assuming that neither series is ever
revised, so that the initial release is identical to the final estimate (as mentioned, given
the very small extent of revision noise for real rents, for this series the assumption is
quite close to the truth). Here, on the other hand, I take into account of the existence
of revision noise for either series as follows. Consider the generic real-time recursive
sample ending in month  , with  ⊆ [January 2003; October 2008]. For the purpose
of detecting the house prices disequilibrium during this specific period–in which the
‘bubble’ was inflating, so that house prices were creeping up compared to rents–the
worst case scenario is one in which both real-time rents, and the real-time supply of
houses, were systematically higher than the final estimates, so that real-time revision
noise (defined as the difference between the real-time estimate available in month 
and the final estimate) was, for either series, consistently positive. The reason for this
is straighforward. As for real rents, the higher the real-time rent compared to the final
estimate, the lower the real-time ratio between house prices and rents, and therefore
the more the SVAR would interpret the increase in real house prices as permanent,
as opposed to transitory. In the limit, if the real-time revision noise for real rents had
been consistently positive during the entire period between January 2003 and October
2008, and sufficiently large, the SVAR would have interpreted the ‘bubble’ as entirely
23I restrict the analysis to the period starting in August 2000 because real-time data for the PCE










     
 
 Figure 9  Results based on a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003, 2004): Real-time estimates 
             of the transitory component of log real house prices, and fractions of bootstrap replications 
             for which the transitory component is estimated to be positive, in the ‘worst-case scenario’ 
             for the ‘revision noise’ for real rents and the supply of homes 
 
due to permanent shocks. As for the supply of homes, the reason is that this series’
fluctuations exhibit a remarkable coherence with the transitory component of real
house prices, but tend to lag it by about two to three years. As a result, if, during the
building up of the house prices’ ‘bubble’, the supply of homes had systematically been
higher than the final estimate, the SVAR would have interpreted this as evidence that
movement in real house prices were driven by permanent, as opposed to transitory
shocks. So the bottom line is that, for either series, the ‘worst case scenario’ for the
purpose of detecting the disequilibrium in real time would have been one in which
the series’ real-time estimate in each month  had been systematically higher than
the final estimate.
I therefore proceed as follows. I compute, for either series, and for each month
 = 0, 1, 2, ... since the first release, the maximum amount of revision noise which
has historically occurred over the periods April 2011-July 2017, and May 2011-July
2017, respectively. To be clear, such maximum amount of revision noise is simply
the maximum, for each month  = 0, 1, 2, ... since the first release, of the series
plotted in the top row of Figure 8 (i.e., the log-distances from the final estimate as
a function of the time elapsed since the first release). Let  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0
be the maximum amount of revision noise for real rents and the supply of homes,
respectively, for month  = 0, 1, 2, ... since the first release. Given the final estimate
of log real rents up to month  ,  = [1 2 3  −2 −1  ]0, I construct
a ‘worst case scenario’ real-time estimate as  = [1 + 

−1 2 + 

−2 3 +
−3  −2 + 

2  −1 + 

1   + 

0 ]
0. For the supply of homes I construct a
‘worst case scenario’ real-time estimate  in the same way. Finally, I repeat the
real-time exercise of Section 6 substituting the final estimates of rents and the supply
of homes I had there with the ‘worst case scenario’ real-time estimates  and
 I just mentioned.
The results are reported in Figure 9: The key finding is that evidence is virtually
the same as in Section 6. Intuitively, this has to do with the fact that, as previously
mentioned, the extent of revision noise for the key series, real rents, is essentially
negligible, so that even if we consider its maximum since 2011 for each month  =
0, 1, 2, ... since the first release, it ultimately does not make any material difference.
Finally, I also consider two alternative ‘extreme worst case scenarios’ in which
I multiply both  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0 by a factor of either 2 or 3. It is worth
stressing that these two cases correspond to an extent of revision noise which is
way outside the realm of what we have historically seen since 2011. The results are
reported in Figures A.19 and A.20 in the online appendix. Once again, even such an
historically anomalous amount of noise does not change results in a material way: The
methodology proposed herein would still have been able to detect the disequilibrium
in house prices in real time.
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9 Conclusions
Since the Great Recession was triggered by the unravelling of a large disequilibrium
in U.S. house prices, one would logically expect that–in the same way as the macro-
economic profession has devoted a vast effort to expanding DSGE models in order to
incorporate a financial and a banking sector–an analogous effort would have been
devoted to developing methods allowing to reliably identify house prices’ disequilib-
ria in real time. Quite surprisingly, this has not been the case. As a consequence,
although policymakers often openly worry that housing markets may be heading into
‘bubble territory’, they have no way of assessing such a possibility within a rigorous
statistical framework. As a consequence, they are unavoidably compelled to resort to
intuitively sensible, but ultimately quite rough indicators such as the rent-price ratio,
or the ratio between house prices and incomes.
In this paper I have explored whether time-series methods exploiting the long-run
equilibrium properties of the housing market might have detected the disequilibrium
in U.S. house prices which pre-dated the Great Recession as it was building up. Based
on real-time data, I have shown that a VAR in levels identified as in Uhlig (2003,
2004) would have detected the disequilibrium with high confidence by the Summer
of 2004, with the estimated extent of overvaluation peaking at about 15 per cent
immediately before the crisis. Cointegrated VARs identified via long-run restrictions,
on the other hand, tend to produce fragile and uniformly weaker results. Conceptually
in line with Cochrane’s (1994) analysis for consumption and GNP, and dividends
and stock prices, the single most important factor in order to reliably and robustly
identify the transitory component of real house prices is applying Uhlig (2003, 2004)-
style identification to real rents, which are cointegrated with house prices, and are
comparatively much closer to the common stochastic trend. In particular, when Uhlig-
style identification is used in order to extract the single most powerful shock at long
horizons for real rents, all horizons greater than or equal to 10 years ahead produce
near numerically identical results for the transitory component of real house prices. By
contrast, when this approach is used in order to extract the most powerful shock for
house prices themselves, alternative long horizons used for identification sometimes
produce materially different results.
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